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Substantial Changes to Partnership Tax Audit Procedures will Severely Impact Partner Liability and Rights Before the IRS

Does your client own an interest in a partnership or an entity treated as a partnership for US tax purposes?  If so, you better take notice because the new partnership tax audit rules are making drastic changes as of January 1, 2018.  The new rules, known as “BBA,” will administer a tax deficiency at  the partnership level, unless certain elections are made.  These rules are a significant departure from the old rules, known as “TEFRA”, which administered a tax deficiency at the individual partner level.  All partnerships will need to amend their respective partnership agreements to take the BBA changes into consideration.  What should a partnership or its partners be concerned about?

Below is a non-exhaustive list of some of the major concerns of these new procedures:

Have you chosen a Partnership Representative (“PR”) under the BBA rules? If so, have you set forth the limitations and obligations of the PR?

  • Once the BBA Rules are effective, all authority over the partnership tax audit lies with the PR
  • The BBA procedures give the PR statutory authority to bind all partners with respect to all actions taken by the partnership in the BBA administrative proceeding and in any judicial proceeding
  • Since the PR is the exclusive party to act on behalf of the partnership, the PR may also, in effect, bind all partners to extensions of the statute of limitations, settlements and available elections

Does your existing partnership agreement require the partnership or the PR to provide notice to all partners of a IRS audit?

  • The BBA procedures abolish all partner-level notices of IRS actions that existed under TEFRA
  • Unlike the TEFRA rules, under BBA there is no affirmative obligation for the Internal Revenue Service, the partnership or the PR to send a notice of an IRS audit to each partner
  • Without revising the partnership agreement, a partnership audit could occur and be resolved without the partners’ knowledge

Does your existing partnership agreement contemplate who will be responsible for tax deficiencies?

  • Under the BBA procedures, unless the PR takes certain actions, tax deficiencies are assessed against the partnership in the year the controversy is resolved (known as the adjustment year) and not in the year which generated the tax deficiency (known as the reviewed year)
  • In effect, the economic burden of a tax deficiency could be borne by partners who had no interest in the partnership when the income/deduction was generated

Does your existing partnership agreement provide for opting-out of the BBA procedures?  If so, does the PR have an affirmative obligation to opt-out?

  • The BBA procedures allow smaller partnerships (with fewer than 100 partners) to elect to opt-out of the BBA rules and have the audit be administered at the partner rather than partnership level
  • Do you desire to have the audit administered at the partner level?  Are you concerned about the IRS expanding the audit to other parts of your business?
  • Are you willing to continue to be responsible for tax deficiencies for the years in which you held an interest in a partnership, even if you later sell such interest.

Does your existing partnership agreement provide for pushing-out tax deficiencies to the reviewed year partners?

  • The push-out election allows the partnership to pass on an adjustment to a former partner without providing them an opportunity to comment, contest, or even receive notice of the adjustment
  • If you exit a partnership are you willing to leave this decision up to the current PR?
  • As a former partner would you desire some control over these decision for which you are ultimately responsible?

The above items address some of the questions partnerships and partners should be thinking about before the BBA procedures go into effect on January 1, 2018.  It is recommended that all partnerships work with their tax counsel to perform a thoughtful and thorough review of their partnership agreements.  The only way to control the results of these new procedures is to be pro-active now before the rules go into effect.

Please contact Jeff Erney at jeffry.erney@dentons.com or Sunny Dhaliwal at sunny.dhaliwal@dentons.com

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IRS To Revise Guidance for In-Person Appeals Conferences

According to Andrew Keyso, Acting Deputy Director of Appeals, the IRS will be issuing new guidance “within the next few weeks” regarding when it will hold an in-person appeals conferences.

Recently, the IRS made waves when it revised the Internal Revenue Manual to limit when a taxpayer was entitled to an in-person appeals conference. The guidance gave Appeals the discretion regarding when to hold an in-person. In making the decision, Appeals was to consider a limited set of facts and circumstances, such as whether a taxpayer had special needs or whether Appeals would have to consider the credibility of a witness. A taxpayer could request one but the decision rested with the Appeals.  The guidance was meant to dramatically limit the number of in-person conferences Appeals would hold.

According to Mr. Keyso, after receiving substantial feedback from the tax community, the IRS will issue new guidance expanding the scope of when in-person meetings will be held.

This is good news for the taxpayer.

Once the new guidance is issued, we will blog about it.  Please check back for updates.

Supreme Court Agrees to Review Sweeping Tax Obstruction of Justice Decision

In a decision that could have far reaching consequences in both the civil and criminal tax realms, on June 27th, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the conviction of Carlo Marinello, who was found guilty of obstructing justice by failing to maintain proper books and records and failing to file tax returns.

The Supreme Court will likely settle a dispute that emerged among the lower courts about the proper scope of the obstruction statute under the Internal Revenue Code. The Supreme Court’s decision will have obvious consequences in the criminal tax world.  That is plain.  What is less apparent, is the power the decision could have in a civil audit.  Depending on how the Supreme Court rules, it could provide the IRS a substantial criminal hammer to wield against taxpayers who dispose of, or fail to maintain, business records, even if they have no knowledge that a criminal investigation has begun.

The Supreme Court will likely hear argument on this case in the fall and issue a decision sometime after that. We will keep you updated on the case, so be sure to check back.

Background

The below facts come from the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

In 1990, Carlos Marinello founded a freight service company that couriered packages between the United States and Canada. He kept little documentation of his income and expenses, and shredded or threw away any documentation that he may have had.  From 1992 onward, Mr. Marinello did not file personal or corporate tax returns.

In 2004, the IRS received an anonymous tip and opened a criminal investigation into Mr. Marinello and his company. That criminal investigation was closed the next year because the IRS could not determine if the unreported income was significant.  Mr. Marinello had no knowledge of that investigation.  Around that same time, he consulted with an attorney and an accountant who advised him he must file returns and maintain proper business records.  Despite that advice, Mr. Marinello did not do so.

The IRS was not done with Mr. Marinello yet. In 2009, the IRS re-opened the investigation and interviewed him. Mr. Marinello admitted to not filing returns and to shredding most of his business records.

The United States charged Mr. Marinello with nine counts of tax-related offenses. The conduct alleged in the indictment occurred prior to Mr. Marinello’s interview with the IRS in 2009.  One of the offenses charged was for obstruction of justice under 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).  Section 7212(a) makes it a crime to “obstruct or impede . . . the due administration of this title.”  The government alleged that Mr. Marinello violated this section by, among other things, “failing to maintain corporate books and records for [his company]” and “destroying, shredding and discarding business records of [his company].” Mr. Marienllo was found guilty of the offense.

Decisions Below

Before the trial court, Mr. Marinello argued that to commit obstruction of justice under section 7212, one must have knowledge of a pending IRS investigation. The trial court rejected such an argument, holding that all that was necessary was for the jury to find that Mr. Marinello intended to obstruct the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws.  He appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals in New York City.

Before the Appeals Court, Mr. Marinello again argued that the obstruction statute requires knowledge of a pending investigation. A panel of the Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the statute “criminalizes corrupt interference with an official effort to administer the tax code, and not merely a known IRS investigation.”  In doing so, the Second Circuit aligned itself with 3 other appeals courts.  It also reinforced a circuit split, as the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati, Ohio had reached a different conclusion on the same question.

Mr. Marinello sought review before the full Second Circuit. While the court declined to review the decision of the panel, two judges dissented from the denial of review and warned of the consequences of the court’s decision.  Judge Jacobs wrote ominously that if this decision was allowed to remain the law of the land, “nobody is safe: the jury charge allowed individual jurors to convict on the grounds, variously, that Marinello did not keep adequate records; that, having kept them, he destroyed them; or that, having kept them and preserved them from destruction, he failed to give them to his accountant.”  The decision affords, he wrote, “oppressive opportunity for prosecutorial abuse.”

Potential Consequences

As Judge Jacobs warned, should the Supreme Court uphold the decision, a taxpayer should be weary about engaging in any of the conduct, such as disposing of business records, that landed Mr. Marinello in jail. As Judge Jacobs so succinctly put it, “How easy it is under the panel’s opinion for an overzealous or partisan prosecutor to investigate, to threaten, to force into pleading, or perhaps (with luck) to convict anybody” (emphasis in the original).  Now, more than ever, it is important that taxpayers in civil cases are represented by competent counsel aware of the potential criminal pitfalls an otherwise cautious taxpayer may find themselves in.

Contact Jeff Erney for questions about this post.  Jeffry.Erney@dentons.com

Partnership Proposed Regulations Re-Released

Today, the prior January 2017 partnership audit proposed regulations were re-released.  A pubic hearing is scheduled for September 18th with comments due by August 14th.  We will monitor the commentaries as they are filed and post them HERE.

Partnership Audit Guidance Soon?

On January 1, 2018 the new partnership audit rules become effective.  Proposed regulations were issued in January of this year to provide broad-based guidance on the implementation and operation of the new statutory regime, but those proposed regulations were withdrawn in the same month due to the new administration’s position freezing proposed regulations and requiring agency review before re-issuance.  With a little over six months to go before the new rules become effective, a considerable amount of uncertainty associated remains and regulatory guidance is desperately needed.  At this point, gaining an understanding of the proposed/withdrawn regulations is the best course of action, as there is no current indication that the proposed rules will be altered in a material way, if issued by the end of the year.

IRS Won’t Shut Down

It appears both the House and Senate will pass H.R. 244, to appropriate funds for the IRS sometime later this week.  The IRS is slated to receive $11.2 billion in new funding through next September 30.  This  funding is at a level about equal to the last full year appropriations bill.

The IRS will need to slate sufficient funds for enforcement while balancing compliance and customer service.  The latter receiving criticism on a number of fronts over the past year.  We will comment on the appropriation specifics once released.

Tax Regulations on Hold-The New Regulatory Freeze

According to a memorandum issued to all agency heads, no federal agency may send regulations to the Federal Register for publishing until advised by the appropriate OMB personnel or designee.   For those regulations that have already been submitted to the Federal Register the agency heads must seek to withdraw them.  Any regulation that has been published in the Federal Register, but aren’t yet effective, those regulations will be postponed a minimum of 60 days with the ability of the agency heads to request a longer suspension.

The only exception are regulations needed for “urgent circumstances relating to health, safety, financial, or national security matters, or otherwise.”  The memorandum explains that the department heads and newly appointed personnel need time to review the regulations and the memorandum is particularly clear that those regulations addressing “questions of fact, law, or policy” could be subject to “further notice-and-comment rule making,” thus further delaying implementation.

There is no carve out in the memorandum for regulations addressing tax matters.  Which tax regulations will become promulgated is not known.  We will keep you posted on any new developments.

Partnership Proposed Regulations Issued – New Audit Rules For Partnerships

The IRS has issued Proposed Regulations addressing the Centralized Partnership Audit Regime.  Back in November of 2015, statutory changes were enacted to replace the traditional audit rules for partnerships and replacing them with a new centralized partnership audit which, in most instances, places the tax liability at the partnership level rather than at the partner level.

Partnerships are pass through entities for US tax purposes and items of income, expense and credits are taken on the personal income tax returns of the individual partners.  Under the new statute, an audit of the partnership could result in additional taxes being owed at the partnership level rather than flowing through to the individual partners.

“It has taken over a year for the proposed regulations to be issued,” said James N. Mastracchio, Co-Chair of Denton’s Tax Controversy Practice, “and that is a good thing.”  The proposed regulations are “extensive” and “cover a number of issues that we face as advisors to our clients.” added Mastracchio.

There will be a long comment period with the ultimate effective date of the regulations to take place in early 2018.

Fast Track Settlements for Collection Cases

Late last year the IRS issued guidance on Fast Track settlement procedures for collection cases.  The goal of the process is to provide resolution of disputed issues within 30-40 calendar days.  Generally, issues involving an offer-in-comprise or trust fund recovery penalties can be brought before an Appeals mediator.  The new program is called SB/SE Fast Track Mediation- Collection (FTMC) and should provide a meaningful avenue to resolve differences.  Ultimate settlement authority continues to reside with Collections and not with IRS Appeals.  See guidance at Rev. Proc 2016-57.

IRS on Alert of Partners Attempting to Slip Through the Cracks Before New Partnership Audit Regime Takes Effect

Despite the significant uncertainty surrounding the new partnership audit regime implemented under the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act (Pub. L. No. 114-74) (“BBA”), the IRS expressed its intention to watch for partners exiting partnerships to avoid tax, during a District of Columbia Bar event on June 23, 2016.

The new rules, effective in 2018, require partnership-level audits of large partnerships, and make it simpler for IRS examiners to undertake an audit because the system will be able to calculate and collect adjustments at the partnership level.   Since there can be several years between when a return is filed and when an audit adjustment is levied, however, it leads to the possibility that partners could sell their interest before the commencement of an audit and avoid adjustments that may have been attributable to them.

Although the panel suggested amending partnership agreements so that partners who sell their interests would still be on the hook for any tax due later, it is unclear whether partners intending on exiting partnerships in light of the new rules would agree to such an amendment. Further, because of the vast uncertainty regarding various areas of the partnership audit rules, most partnerships are not amending their agreements at this time.

The IRS intends to issue regulations with an effective date of January 1, 2018, which would address the scope of the rules and how statute of limitations are applied in this context.   Many areas of uncertainty with the new rules, however, have not yet been addressed by the IRS.

One major area of uncertainty revolves around the “partnership representative,” which is an expanded version of the “tax matters partner” role under prior law. The partnership representative, which is not required to be a partner, will have sole authority to act on behalf of the partnership in an audit proceeding, and will bind both the partnership and the partners by its actions in the audit. The IRS no longer will be required to notify partners of partnership audit proceedings or adjustments, and partners will be bound by determinations made at the partnership level.

It appears that partners neither will have rights to participate in partnership audits or related judicial proceedings, nor standing to bring a judicial action if the partnership representative does not challenge an assessment. Accordingly, the partnership representative is vested with significant responsibility and power under the BBA, and would likely need to devote the majority of his or her time addressing these issues. This raises the possibility that certain individuals might be compensated for this role, and the role might be limited by the provisions of the partnership agreement. At the very least, there should be provisions in place to have a degree of control over elections made at the entity level, or final determinations at the entity level.

Another noteworthy area of concern is how the new rules would impact State tax filings. States have not yet reacted to the new rules, and thus, partners may be reluctant to make amendments until they are aware of both the state and federal implications of the audit rules. The IRS expects to issue guidance in stages to alleviate some of the concerns expressed by practitioners and allow them to move forward with amendments to partnership agreements.

Notwithstanding the uncertainty, it is clear that the IRS is watching for those seeking to take advantage of the new regime to avoid tax.

Sixth Circuit Sharpens Ford’s Focus on Payment of Overpayment Interest

While it appears that Ford’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court yielded Ford some of the answers it was looking for, Ford is still without the approximately $470 million in what it argues is overpayment interest.  As we discussed in a previous article, the Supreme Court asked the Sixth Circuit to address the question of proper venue.  The Government had previously argued that the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)) is the only general waiver of sovereign immunity regarding overpayment interest.  As such, the Government urged a district court would not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) as Ford was not seeking to recover money that was already paid.  In an opinion dated October 1, the Sixth Circuit denied the Government’s claim that refund claims for overpayment interest, as opposed to claims for tax, penalties, and interest on tax and penalties, must exclusively be brought in the Court of Federal Claims rather than an appropriate federal district court.  This issue had previously been decided by the Sixth Circuit in Scripps Co. v. United States, 420 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2005).  In Scripps, the Sixth Circuit held that a suit to obtain overpayment interest includes a “recovery” of money as is described in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).  The Sixth Circuit, in seeing no reason to revisit the Scripps decision, declined to revisit the issue and held against the Government’s jurisdiction claim.

Once the Sixth Circuit confirmed proper jurisdiction of the case, it then turned to the merits of the case.  The Sixth Circuit initially addressed whether Section 6611 (relating to overpayment of interest) constitutes a “waiver of sovereign immunity that must be strictly construed,” which would, in turn, require a narrow reading of the term “overpayment.”  The Government argued that Section 6611 constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity, and as such, the term “overpayment” should be subject to the strict construction canon.  Ford argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) was the appropriate waiver of sovereign immunity, and that Section 6611 was instead a substantive right underlying the claim.  The Sixth Circuit found that, during the years at issue, any distinction between overpayments of “deposits in the nature of a cash bond” and “advance tax payments” had been made by the Service and not by Congress.  As such, the Sixth Circuit held that the any distinction between deposits and advance tax payments are substantive only, and do not implicate sovereign immunity.

Next, the Sixth Circuit turned to the “date of overpayment,” and whether such date is properly determined as the day that Ford remitted deposits or, alternatively, the date that on which such deposits were converted into advance tax payments.  The Sixth Circuit determined that this issue turns on whether the payments were made by Ford “for the purpose of discharging its estimated tax obligations.”  The Sixth Circuit looked to the “tradeoffs” presented in Rev. Proc. 84-85 (which had been in effect during the years at issue).  In essence, the Sixth Circuit determined that in order for Ford to stop the accrual of underpayment interest, Ford had the ability to either (i) remit a cash-bond deposit which would not pay Ford potential overpayment interest, but which could be returned upon Ford’s demand, or (ii) make an advance tax payment, which would allow Ford to recoup interest with respect to an overpayment, but would deny Ford the immediate ability to recoup the funds.  The Sixth Circuit viewed the form of the remittances, either as a cash-bond deposit or an advance tax payment, as dispositive of the purpose of the payment.  As such, since Ford initially remitted cash-bond deposits, the Sixth Circuit found that Ford “did not remit those deposits to discharge its estimated tax deficiency.”  Thus, the Sixth Circuit held for the Government and found that the remittances were cash-bond deposits that were not entitled to overpayment interest, and that the “date of overpayment” did not begin until the date the payments were converted to advance tax payments.

While Ford received favorable rulings from the Sixth Circuit regarding both proper venue and whether Section 6611 constitutes a separate waiver of sovereign immunity, Ford ultimately lost regarding when an “overpayment” begins.  Ford now has the ability to file yet another petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.  While any potential petition remains to be seen, it appears that the case at hand is finally narrowed down to the sole issue of when an “overpayment” begins.

IRS Granted Considerable Latitude to Delay Payment of Tax Refunds

A recent Fifth Circuit opinion, El Paso CGP Co., L.L.C. v. United States, illustrates that the IRS’s authority under the Code’s mitigation rules is, at least in the Fifth and Third Circuits, construed broadly.  Acknowledging the general rule that a closing agreement with the IRS prevents the IRS from reopening a year included in that agreement, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion—overall, favorable to the IRS—turns upon the exceptions to this general rule found in the Code’s mitigation rules, which allow the IRS to reopen a closed tax year through an assessment within one year of a closing agreement.  However, the Fifth Circuit offered a taxpayer-friendly interpretation of the variance doctrine, which generally provides that in a refund suit, a taxpayer may not raise a ground for recovery which was not previously set forth in the taxpayer’s administrative refund claim.

As is the case in many tax cases, this dispute involved a much earlier tax year—here, 1986.  On a company’s 1986 tax return, the company claimed various tax credits, which exceeded the allowable amount for that year.  As a result, the company carried some of those credits forward to 1987 through 1990.  After an IRS audit of the 1986 tax return, the IRS disallowed some of the credits and increased the company’s liabilities for 1986 – 1990, which the company later paid.

Several years later, the IRS and the company executed a Form 870-AD (“Offer to Waive Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Tax Deficiency and to Accept Overassessment”), in which the company agreed to the assessment and collection of a tax deficiency for 1986 but reserved the right to file a claim for refund.  The company later exercised this right and filed an approximately $18 million refund claim, primarily attributable to replacing the disallowed tax credits with other tax credits which the company originally had carried forward to later years.  This action, however created tax deficiencies for 1987 through 1990.

In July 2005, the IRS and the company agreed on the amounts of liability owed or refund due for each of the 1986 through 1990 taxable years and entered a “Closing Agreement”.  Pursuant to the Closing Agreement the company was owed a refund for 1986 and had deficiencies for 1987 – 1990.

In September 2005, the IRS made only a partial payment of the agreed-upon refund due for 1986.  The IRS asserted that the remaining portion would be used to satisfy the deficiencies for 1987 – 1990.  In August 2006, the company sought from the IRS a refund the remaining amount for 1986, asserting that the IRS had failed to assess deficiencies within the applicable one-year statute of limitations.  The company further asserted that the IRS was precluded from collecting deficiencies from 1987 – 1990 because the IRS failed to follow the mitigation rules.  The IRS denied the refund claim, and the company filed a refund suit in district court.

The district court granted summary judgment to the Government.  First, the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the refund suit was not based on a valid administrative refund claim.  The district court reasoned that the administrative refund claim was disposed of by the Closing Agreement.   As another basis for holding that it lacked jurisdiction, the district court concluded that the refund suit violated the variance doctrine because the grounds for recovery in the refund suit varied from the grounds in the original administrative refund claim.  The company appealed.

Stating that courts “have not always been so dogmatic in applying” the variance doctrine, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court and concluded that it had jurisdiction over the refund suit.  The Fifth Circuit noted that there is an exception from the variance doctrine where, as in this case, the Government’s “unilateral action creates the substantial variance.”  The court further stated that the Government “cannot use the variance doctrine to straightjacket the taxpayer when the Government unexpectedly changes its litigation strategy.”

It was not all bad news for the Government though.  Although the court concluded that the IRS had failed to assess tax within the applicable period of limitations, the court concluded the IRS had complied with the mitigation rules (i.e., which allowed the IRS to reopen the closed tax years).

The court rejected a contention from the company that each tax year must be treated separately and followed an approach taken by the Third Circuit.  Pursuant to that approach, the court reasoned that the separate-tax-year concept should not apply where the parties reach an agreement, such as the Closing Agreement, that permits the IRS to pay out or recover a sum attributable to multiple years.  Accordingly, the court held that when a taxpayer enters into a closing agreement with the IRS, the IRS can comply with the mitigation rules by “assessing and collecting” any net deficiency from the years covered by the Closing Agreement (or, alternatively, by  “refunding or crediting” a net overpayment).

This approach essentially allows the IRS to take a piecemeal approach to resolving a taxpayer’s liability after entering a Closing Agreement and affords the IRS another “bite at the apple,” even after statutes of limitations for assessment are arguably closed—which could substantially delay closure of a tax dispute and payment of a refund.

Ford Attempts to Catch the Ear of SCOTUS in Pursuit of Approximately $470 Million

Approximately five years after its Detroit counterparts received billions of dollars from the federal government, Ford Motor Company is attempting to recoup approximately $470 million in overpayment interest it believes it is owed from the federal government.  Ford has petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States claiming that the Sixth Circuit improperly extended the “narrow construction” of a waiver of sovereign immunity to a narrow construction of Section 6611 of the Internal Revenue Code (relating to interest on overpayment of taxes).  In arguing that certiorari is warranted, Ford noted that there is confusion among the circuit courts over the application of the strict construction canon to waivers of sovereign immunity.  The Supreme Court docket for Ford’s case can be found here, and the petition for certiorari is here.

Originally, for the tax years 1983-1989, 1992, and 1994, the IRS determined that Ford had underpaid its taxes.  In an effort to toll potential interest charges on its potential underpayment, Ford took advantage of a special rule in Rev. Proc. 84-58 that allowed it to make additional payments as a cash bond (i.e., a deposit), which had the effect of stopping the accrual of underpayment interest.  Years later, Ford converted the deposit into an “advance payment” to satisfy further tax liabilities.  However, the IRS subsequently determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes for the years in question.  Ford then received from the IRS the amount of the overpayment, plus interest.  The parties agree on the amount of the overpayment, but disagree as to when the overpayment interest should begin to accrue.

Ford argued, unsuccessfully, that the date of overpayment began once Ford had submitted the deposit.  The government argued that since the payments must be made with respect to a tax liability, the date of overpayment did not begin until Ford requested that the IRS treat the cash bonds as “advance payments” to satisfy further tax liabilities.   The district court agreed with the government, holding that Ford was not entitled to overpayment interest until it converted the deposit into an advance payment.  Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2775 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (available through PACER and major commercial reporting services).

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, acknowledging that Ford’s interpretation of Code Section 6611 was “strong,” applied a strict construction canon to Code Section 6611 and affirmed the holding of the district court.  Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 508 Fed. Appx. 506 (6th Cir. 2012) (not recommended for publication).  The Sixth Circuit found that that Code Section 6611 is the provision that waives sovereign immunity for claims of overpayment interest and that the canon of narrow construction should apply to resolve the interpretation of Code Section 6611 in the government’s favor.

Ford is now asserting that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) is the provision that waives the government’s sovereign immunity with respect to overpayment interest, and Code Section 6611 is the provision that confers the substantive right underlying the claim for overpayment interest.  As such, and consistent with Supreme Court precedent, Code Section 6611 should not, Ford argues, be subject to the strict construction canon.  In Ford’s petition for certiorari, it argued that “in direct conflict with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents, the Sixth Circuit invoked the strict construction canon to construe not the waiver of sovereign immunity, but instead the separate, substantive provision.”  If the Supreme Court rules in Ford’s favor (and sends the case back to the Sixth Circuit on remand), the Sixth Circuit’s seemingly sympathetic view of Ford’s reading of Code Section 6611 may ultimately lead to a decision that could lead to some taxpayers seeking additional interest on overpayments.   However, in 2004 Congress enacted Code Section 6603, which provides, in general, that if a taxpayer follows certain procedures pursuant to a deposit made after October 22, 2004, interest may accrue from the date of the deposit so long as the deposit is with respect to a “disputable tax.”  Thus, even if Ford were to prevail, taxpayers that follow the requirements of Code Section 6603 (and corresponding Revenue Procedure 2005-18) will not have to rely on the Ford case.

Qualified Offers and the Recovery of Administrative and Litigation Costs from the IRS

Taxpayers and taxpayers’ counsel may be able to proactively fit within the net worth requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), which sets forth the standard applicable to both recovery of litigation costs and shifting the burden of proof to the government in tax cases. For example, a taxpayer may be able to successfully fit within net worth requirements by making distributions at any time before the date the case is filed. The following discussion provides a summary of this taxpayer position in recent litigation, the government’s opposition to this position, and the taxpayer’s appropriate—and successful—reply. In addition, relevant portions of the court’s holding and the case law the Government relied upon is also attached for the convenience of the reader. This discussion contains excerpts from Southgate Master Fund, LLC v. United States651 F. Supp. 2d 596 (N.D. Tex. 2009).

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